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By William Minter*
*William Minter is Senior Research Associate at the Africa Policy Information Center in Washington, DC.
In the Cold War era there was often a deceptive clarity that defined political judgements about international interventions in internal conflicts. Those who shared the anti-communist consensus assumed that Western intervention against revolutionaries was justified by the overwhelming threat posed by the Soviet bloc. Those who favored revolution more often called for "self-reliance" but were willing to make exceptions, as when Cuban troops came to Angola to counter CIA, South African and Zairian intervention on the other side. (Of course, the other side also portrayed their intervention as a justified response to previous Cuban and Soviet involvement).
Consciously or unconsciously, attitudes toward various forms of "intervention," from supply of weapons or advisors to direct troop deployment, were defined by global political alignments. With the disappearance of that relatively clear, if admittedly simplistic, framework, the temptation is to think that one can find relatively objective "a-political" guidelines to sort out "good" interventions from "bad" interventions.
I do not want to disparage the necessary effort to work out guidelines, whether for national governments, multilateral institutions or activists for peace and human rights. The continuing effort to ensure accountability and compliance with basic human rights by military forces of whatever origin needs to continue. But I do not think it is just being picky to enter a caveat. However difficult it may be to sort out uncertain facts and to make even more difficult judgements, there is no avoiding making particular judgements about the rights and wrongs of particular conflicts, and the consequences of either "intervening" or "non-intervening" by particular external parties.
"Intervention" is itself a tricky and flexible concept. If we exclude traditional international "peacekeeping" operations approved by both sides to an internal conflict, there is still the question of whether the term "intervention" only applies to the extreme case of sending combat troops across a border, or whether advisers, training, logistical support, arms supplies or even aggressive diplomatic action towards other parties to affect the military balance constitutes "intervention." While jurist s may require a formal definition, I think a political analysis must be based on a more substantive definition, including any outside action that significantly (another fuzzy term) affects the military balance in a conflict.
A blanket "no external intervention" guideline with respect to internal conflicts should be recognized as de facto support for the strongest "internal" party. The Organization of African Unity's post-independence consensus on non-intervention in internal conflicts may have decreased the chances for inter-state conflict, but it also reinforced existent regimes. The liberation struggles against colonial and white-minority regimes were recognized as an exception, and the issues themselves defined as not just "internal." African capacity for military "intervention" was limited, but bases, other facilities and in some few cases, troops, were supplied to liberation movements (for example, Mozambican troops in Zimbabwe). Other cases, such as Tanzanian intervention in Uganda to overthrow Idi Amin in 1979, were more controversial.
In the current context, there is increasing recognition that massive abuses of human rights in internal conflicts-most particularly those reaching the scale of genocide-may justify external intervention. But there seems there is no emerging consensus- and I would argue there is very unlikely to be one--on who should intervene and who should decide when abuses are massive enough to justify intervention. There is a common presumption that accountable multilateral intervention is preferable in principle, but in practice any multilateral intervention is largely determined by the particular powers most willing and able to commit military resources. "Multilateral good, unilateral bad" is hardly a sufficient guideline.
The concept of a purely "humanitarian" intervention, simply in order to aid innocent civilians and devoid of political or military implications, is a fraud. An intervention with limited mandate-to protect corridors or relief supplies-may or may not be justified in a particular case. But it will have political consequences; it will weaken some forces and strengthen others. And it may prepare the seeds of further conflict. The decision for or against must take into account such possible consequences , as well as the likely immediate consequences in lives saved.
This brief note is not intended to illustrate the point with particular examples, abundantly available in the interrelated conflicts in the Great Lakes and the Congo preceding and following the genocide in Rwanda, as well as many other cases. It is s imply to stress that there is no avoiding particular "political" judgements about particular situations, which are linked to one's evaluation of (1) the relative merits (and demerits) of the internal parties in conflict, (2) the relative merits (and demerits) of the potential "interveners," and (3) the likely de facto unintended and long-term consequences of the intervention as well as its announced goals and short-term life-saving potential. It is insufficient to consider only one set of factors and develop simplistic formulas such as, to give only a few examples, "African intervention good, non-African intervention bad," or "intervention with US military contributing transport always bad-or always good."
A presumption against external intervention to shift the balance of forces in internal conflicts does make sense as a general starting point. Even if "innocents" can be saved or the "good guys" (or more likely, the "less bad guys") can be saved from destruction or aided to "win" by outside forces, the sustainability of such an outcome is questionable once the outsiders' interest wanes. But the exceptions are numerous enough to make a blanket prohibition unconscionable- "interventions" can in fact save lives, tip a military balance towards one side, or towards the possibility of negotiation.
Similarly, a presumption against unilateral intervention and towards multilateral intervention preceded by consensus building, including consultation with representatives of civil society, also makes sense. But in fact outside parties and civil society may-in fact, likely are-also polarized, divided or at least confused. In effect, ruling out unilateral external intervention may be ruling out intervention itself.
Deciding which exceptions make sense, however, requires making political judgements on the contenders, the interveners and the likely outcomes. There may be no "white hats" or no "angels" in today's conflicts, as so frequently remarked. I would argue, however, that in most-not all-conflicts there are relevant moral and political differences, parties whose continued military strength is a clear threat to a better future. In this category I would put, for example, UNITA in Angola, the forces of the former Rwandan regime (genocidaires), and Sudan's current military government. Others might have other lists, or disagree with one of these. But that it is precisely my point. Such judgements are political-and particular.
Of "interveners" whose own credentials are particularly questionable, one might mention Nigeria in West Africa or France in the Great Lakes region. Yet Nigeria's role in Liberia through ECOWAS-and perhaps in Sierra Leone-is judged by many as an essential support for peacekeeping given the lack of other alternatives. Similarly, many argued in favor of international military intervention in eastern Zaire that might have included France, or reinforced the former Rwandan regime, and/or lengthened Mobutu' s hold on power, because of the lives at risk. Judgements about the Rwandan and Ugandan roles in the overthrow of the Mobutu regime are inextricably linked to the analysts' evaluations of the "interveners" as well as of the internal parties. Again, my point is not to argue these cases here, but simply to say that making judgements about particulars, including the likelihood of particular outcomes, is an essential part of making the judgement.
The suffering we see in one conflict after another does indeed "cry out" for intervention. Yet the consequences of actual interventions often appall even many of those who called for the interventions in the first place. It would be easier if there w ere some formula to apply to tell us which intervention would actually alleviate human suffering and increase the chances that people of a given country would get their chance for a fresh start, and which should be opposed because of its ulterior motives or high probability of making things worse. If, as I believe, such reliable formulas do not exist, it is better to recognize that, and get on to sorting out our messy and inevitably inconclusive collective judgements on particular cases.
As a corollary, we must recognize the likelihood of ongoing disagreements among humanitarians, progressives, and people of good will. If "dialogue" is needed among internal parties to a conflict, it is equally essential among those outsiders-from immediate neighbors to multilateral agencies to international civil society to citizens of self-proclaimed "super-powers"-who hope that their involvement may do more good than harm.
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© ACAS, November, 1997