It was inevitable that many Nigerians, particularly human rights and pro-democracy groups would reject both the appointment of General Abubakar, and his expressed intention of continuing with General Sani Abacha's discredited and rejected transition programme. Both have been done in utter contempt of the Nigerian people as though they exist only as pawns in a game played out in military "smoke-filled rooms", with no suggestion or idea that they might be entitled to a say in what should happen in the country following the death of General Abacha.
It is expected that by their support for the June 12th programmes set by the pro-democracy umbrella groups, UAD and JACON, the Nigerian people will show whether they are prepared to allow Abubakar or any other military chieftain to set the agenda for this country without reference to them. Nigerians are expected to mark the day by remaining at home, or coming out only to participate in rallies and demonstrations against the continuation of military rule.
The only reason why the Abubakar regime might insist on continuing the Abacha transition could be a determination to uphold the illegal act of Ibrahim Babangida (Abubakar's townsman) in purporting to annul the election of Chief M.K.O. Abiola as President of Nigeria on June 12th 1998. Even if one wants to be charitable, a true desire to return Nigeria to genuine democracy is not compatible with any continuation of the Abacha transition, and one would expect any clear-sighted assessment of the true situation in the country to reach this inevitable conclusion.
A certain amount of instability is inevitable in the present circumstances. Abacha's regime was itself unstable. (E.g. the alleged coup plots, the admitted entrapment of General Diya, the obsession with security which led to the cancellation of Abacha's last proposed visit to Lagos which surprised nobody who paid any attention to Abacha's other sorties from Aso Rock, etc.) In the circumstances, the obsession with "smooth succession", "no power vacuum" etc. which has characterised much comment since Abacha's death - though understandable - could turn out to be a meaningless postponement unless the right (morally right and logically right) steps are taken. The quiet of the graveyard should not be mistaken for the peace and security in which meaningful plans for progress can be made. The question is whether the instability will be of such a nature as to lay the conditions for genuine peace and progress, or whether it will be of the type which only generates more instability with no end in sight. Nigeria is living and tragic demonstration of the truth that "a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be held down." In their call for a resolution of the June 12th issue, it has been the position of the pro-democracy and human rights community that without Justice there can be no Peace in Nigeria. Nigerians should therefore be ready to bear the inconveniences of achieving Justice. Anything else will simply amount to a time-wasting attempt to postpone the day of reckoning.
Why the Abacha Transition Should Not be Continued
The reasons against the continuation of the transition are many and weighty: Most of those participating in it are discredited and tainted by the mere fact of their participation in it. Anybody who participated in the transition (at least, anybody who hoped to succeed in it) must of necessity have closed their eyes to all the abuses perpetrated by the Abacha regime. Participants needed to ensure that they did not at any time speak out on political prisoners, the corruption of the Abacha regime itself, the comatose state to which the economy had been reduced, the spread of poverty and retrenchment throughout the nation, the collapse of basic utilities, the continuing fuel shortage etc. etc., for fear that any adverse comment on the performance of the Abacha government might be taken as criticism of Abacha himself. Because it was clear at a very early stage that there was "no vacancy" at Aso Rock, those hoping for success in Abacha's transition would not want to get on his wrong side since he was obviously going to still be in power at its conclusion.
All the elections which have taken place under the transition have been characterised by extremely undemocratic practices, in particular, disqualification of candidates for unspecified "security reasons" before, during and after elections, even on the point of being sworn in. The unrebutted perception was that only those who would constitute no threat or challenge to Abacha would be allowed to scale the electoral hurdles. Such persons can hardly therefore inspire any confidence in the people whom they are supposed to represent. In fact the low turnout at the senatorial elections (despite the fraudulent figures concocted by the NECON) only underlined a trend which had been apparent throughout the transition, from the very first "no-party" local government elections.
The five political parties have been described as the "five leprous fingers of a diseased hand" (by Bola Ige, former civilian governor of Oyo State, now held in political detention without charge or trial). Now the owner of the diseased hand has died. How can the fingers have any independent life? They have shown no shred of autonomy in anything they have done. Apart from their craven refusal to comment on issues affecting the lives of ordinary Nigerians, the manner in which they all "nominated" General Abacha as their choice for Presidential Candidate has removed any vestige of credibility from them.
Most principled political voices in Nigeria have been totally excluded from the Abacha transition in one way or another: it is those who are lucky who suffered only the disqualification or non-registration of their parties. Others have been imprisoned, been forced into exile, or suffered the extreme sanction of assassination. There is no surgery or alteration that can be made to the existing Abacha transition to allow these voices a fair part in it within the three and a half months left for it to run its course. It must be emphasized that nearly all those who have emerged from the elections so far held under Abacha's transition have done so because they fit in with Abacha's warped, repressive and totally undemocratic version of "home grown democracy". In other words, the criterion for success in Abacha's democracy is one's total lack of democratic understanding.
In the circumstances, even if it were possible (and frankly, it is not) to hold democratic Presidential elections in the very short time available, how would a democratically elected President co-exist with a National Assembly composed of the dictator's surrogates?
For these reasons, simply going ahead to hold the presidential elections cannot work any magic, cannot produce freedom of choice for Nigerians, and cannot unblock the political logjam which has remained since the annulment of the June 12th election.
The declared intention of the Abubakar regime to continue the Abacha transition therefore, is not a "concession" or a "hopeful sign" for Nigeria, but rather, reflective of an incomprehensible determination to continue along the fast track on the course to nowhere, set by Abacha. It indicates a wilful throwing away of a chance to regain credibility and respectability for the armed forces of Nigeria.
If Abubakar insists on any continuation of the Abacha transition, or allowing the unsavoury actors who have taken part in it so far to retain their ill-gotten "electoral" gains, it is certain that any civilian president "elected" under that transition will face exactly the same objections, opposition and resistance which made it impossible for Abacha to move Nigeria forward, which reduced him to such a paranoid obsession with his own security that he became a virtual prisoner inside Aso Rock. No Justice = no Peace.
The Other Options
The impossibility of achieving any genuine democracy within the short time available before October 1st (the date which the military have given themselves) means that there are two main options available: Commencing a completely new transition under the Abubakar regime. Handing over immediately to a civilian Government of National Unity led by Chief M.K.O. Abiola. This would convene a Sovereign National Conference which would have absolute power to determine the way forward for Nigeria, including the form which its democracy should take.
New Transition Under the Military
The first option carries with it the inevitable price of extending the date for hand over to civilian rule. It is clear that this will not be acceptable to Nigerians, and could hardly be maintained by the Abubakar regime. Nigerians have come to understand that the military cannot give what they do not have, that you cannot (as the song says) "drink whisky from a bottle of wine".
Civil society would grow stronger and more united in its opposition to the military, and it would be difficult for anybody who wants to retain any credibility in Nigerian political life to accept any position under the regime (even under guise of "saving the nation from disintegration" - the excuse given by former progressives for joining the Abacha government) during any extended tenure.
The Abubakar regime must determine very quickly whether it will release Abacha's political prisoners, or whether it will continue the repression. But even if there were such releases, there can be no expectation that those released would give up the struggle for democracy after having suffered so much in its cause. How would the Abubakar regime respond to such dissent?
Although the Abubakar regime might make some gesture towards people such as Abiola, while fashioning out its own transition, it would not be easy for principal civilian actors to cohabit with the military as junior partners in the face of the demands of the Nigerian people who are increasingly vocal in their opposition to any form of military rule. Even if the possibility of cohabitation with the military as senior partners could be realised, the experience of Nigeria under the illegal Shonekan (civilian-led) Interim National Government between October 1st and November 17th 1993, when it was clear that Abacha was the one calling the shots, ending with his sacking Shonekan and assuming absolute power provides a very dangerous precedent as to what might happen if Abiola or other civilians were to agree to this option. A legal challenge with a compliant and much-compromised judiciary as arbiter would provide the basis for a repetition of November 17 1993.
The deceptions practised by Babangida and Abacha when they first came to power, and their subsequent behaviour as they felt themselves more and more comfortably entrenched, mean that very few will be ready to give Abubakar the benefit of the doubt, knowing that he could very well use that opportunity to consolidate his hold on power because the tragic experience of Nigerians has been that military rulers have found it difficult - in fact impossible - to resist the tendency of power to corrupt. The fear that he would again start finding reasons why he couldn't hand over yet, personality cult, and eventual refusal to go could not be assuaged by anything that he might say, because Nigerians have seen leaders swearing to do the right thing before.
Government of National Unity and Sovereign National Conference
This is not to say that the second option is risk-free. The rumours about whether or not Abiola has been "injected with some substance [to turn him into a vegetable, idiot, fatally sick etc.]" - however wild or speculative they may be - show not only the extent to which Nigerians have learned to distrust those in power, but also a realisation that it could be dangerous to pin all hopes on one man, who is - when all is said and done - only human. That after all, is the problem in which the pro-Abacha campaigners who were threatening to suicide if he failed to become civilian president now find themselves. (Or would be a problem if they had any shred of integrity.) However, unless and until Abiola is released, and unless and until there is specific and unequivocal revocation by him of the remains of his mandate, the second option is clearly the most desirable.
In the first place, it is the one on which all the pro-democracy and human rights groups have come to agree. The CLO was the first to put forward this solution as a compromise between the demands of those whose starting point was that Nigeria required a Sovereign National Conference to determine the way ahead for the country's transition to civil rule, which would be supervised by civilians, that the whole Babangida transition was flawed and that its fruits - including the June 12th election - must necessarily be flawed and should all be rejected on the one hand, and the demands of those who insisted that June 12th must be realised, and that Abiola must be allowed to take up and fulfill his mandate on the other hand. Despite serious differences which existed at first on this issue, every major pro-democracy movement has come to support and uphold the GNU/SNC solution.
It is the easiest way of resolving the June 12th issue. That issue needs to be resolved because only the most stubborn military apologist argues against the perception - amply supported by the facts on the ground - that nothing has gone right in Nigeria since the June 12th election was annulled, and that nothing will go right until it is addressed. And in politics, the appearance is as important as the reality. So such perceptions can make or mar any plans for the future. Because of its identification with the person of Abiola, his heading a GNU would assuage the feeling of wrong felt by those who insist on actualisation of June 12th as Nigeria's freest and fairest election ever etc. That is a major part of the Justice upon which any Peace in Nigeria can be built.
It is the fastest way of returning Nigeria to civilian rule. It has the added benefit of not requiring any ritualistic waiting until October 1st, since it could be realised immediately. There would then be more time for Nigerians to create and chart their own future through the medium of a Sovereign National Conference.
I.Nigeria would then be set on a course which would give it good fruit from a good tree or, whisky from a bottle of whisky ...
The Immediate Future
Although there are suggestions that Nigerians should "wait and see" or "give General Abubakar some time", the CLO cannot identify with these as useful or safe. On the contrary, for the reasons set out above relating to Nigeria's experience with previous regimes with which they made this mistake, it will be idle and dangerous. There is a strong consensus that General Abubakar should not be allowed any breathing space, for into that space fall the hopes and aspirations of the Nigerian people. Rather, the talk is of striking while the iron is hot, or, to quote Dr. Ola Soyinka: "General Abubakar has chosen to sit on the hot seat. Let's make it hot for him."
Only late General Abacha can say whether he ever genuinely meant his promises to remain in office only a short time, or whether he was persuaded by sycophants and hangers-on to believe that it would be possible for him to bend Nigeria to his will and remain in office for ever. But since those sycophants and hangers-on are still very much around and even promising (incomprehensibly or ominously in the case of those calling for Abacha to succeed himself) to continue their campaigns and not to disband their "structures", Nigerians would be ill-advised to assume that General Abubakar is, or will remain, immune to the siren song.
There was no attempt by General Abubakar to consult Nigerians before he announced his decision to continue the ill-starred Abacha transition. According to his broadcast to the nation, it was the Provisional Ruling Council - an unelected, unrepresentative military body - which took this disastrous decision. (CLO should make it clear before it happens, that "consultations" with so-called traditional rulers will not be an acceptable substitute).
It is by no means impossible to go back and reverse the declared support for Abacha's transition. But since he has provided no avenue for the Nigerian people to have their own say, it is expected that they will show him on June 12th that he cannot ignore them, and proceed as if they have no right to a say in their own future.
All hands cannot "be on deck" (as Abubakar has asked) on a ship whose captain has already set a dangerous course to a fatal destination. Political exiles (some with capital treason charges hanging over their heads) can hardly be expected to return when their counterparts in Nigeria are variously in jail or "underground", and this underlines the error made by General Abubakar in failing to make any reference to political prisoners.
It has to be noted that General Abubakar has already given intimations of the same sort of inability to read the mood of the Nigerian people that was so characteristic of the Abacha regime. For example his use of the term "self-exile" rather than "forced exile" or even the neutral "exile" to describe those who have fled abroad to avoid imprisonment or death is an ominous sign, but an easily avoidable mistake. His failure to mention the fate of the numerous political prisoners - whose numbers increased greatly in the last weeks of Abacha's life - in his maiden broadcast is nothing short of astonishing. Instead, in the face of the well documented reactions of people all over the federation - dancing, rejoicing and heartfelt relief from Lagos to Enugu to Maiduguri, and condemnation of Abacha even in his home town of Kano - (of which Abubakar could not have remained ignorant) he not only spent the greater part of his first address to the nation praising Abacha - but went on to extend the period of "mourning" from a week to a month. The fact that the spontaneous reaction of most Nigerians was in direct contravention of the African convention that one should not speak evil of the dead, or rejoice at the passing of any one (because we will all die) speaks volumes about Abacha, and how he was perceived by his subjects. It would be as idle to imagine that Nigerians are going to spend a week (let alone a month) mourning him as it would have been to expect the citizens of Congo (Kinshasa) to mourn the passing of Mobutu Sese Seko. Hypocrisy is all very well, but independent Nigerian television stations showed pictures of the wild jubilation with which Nigerians greeted the news of Abacha's demise.
Whether or not he is a "career soldier", General Abubakar has been living in Nigeria, and has been part and parcel of Abacha's administration. He has known, and must have had an opinion about the political prisoners held by Abacha, the self-succession bid and the whole direction taken by the Abacha transition. He must have known and had views about the sealing up of newspapers houses by the SSS, seizure of passports, the killing of the labour movement, the disobedience to court orders, the Ogoni 20 and the host of other human rights abuses which have made Nigeria a pariah nation. If he needs time to know that these things are wrong, if he does not understand that any extra minute in which these evils continue when he has the power to instantly halt them is a spreading blot on the escutcheon of military honour, then he will be showing the exact traits of the Abacha regime of which he was a member: namely a paralysed inability or wilful refusal to do the right thing.
The International Community
A delicate line has to be trod between appearing to "dictate" to the Abubakar regime, and allowing it that breathing space which may prove so fatal to any hopes for genuine democracy in Nigeria. In this regard, the CLO must express its disappointment and concern at the statements which continue to be made about hoping that there will now be genuine democratic elections, and at the same time that there will be a hand over by October 1st (which for reasons set out above are absolutely incompatible). Such statements imply that the international community will not object if General Abubakar continues the same Babangida/Abacha weaving and dodging, and sifting through the same murky iron ore in pretence of a search for gold, only to present us with some iron pyrites on October 1st.
It was clear from the promulgation of the first Transition to Civil Rule Decrees that Abacha had no genuine plan to return Nigeria to democracy. Despite repeated warnings from civil society in general, and the pro-democracy human rights groups in particular on this, the international community continued to express quite unjustified hopes for the success of the transition as if it was indeed believed that there would be a truly democratic outcome to the programme. (I.e. as if there would indeed be gold nuggets produced from the heap of iron ore).
The CLO has warned in the past against dealing with Nigeria as if it was necessary only to be on good terms with Abacha, or as if the only important matter was what Abacha wanted, and as if the Nigerian people - being powerless - need not be considered or consulted in the quest to maintain good diplomatic and economic relations with Nigeria. It is to be hoped that the international community will not approach Abubakar and his regime in the same way.
The international community should speak as directly to the people of Nigeria as diplomatic relations and niceties will allow. It is important not to allow any gap whereby anti-Western sentiments (which would be applied against any country in any continent - including Africa - if people like Ikimi and Wada Nas remain in office - which would itself be a signal of another kind) could be whipped up because these would have the effect of obscuring and possibly discrediting the points which might be being made. Making it clear that such interventions, advice and representations are being made because of the clearly expressed wishes of the Nigerian people, and out of identification with the difficulties which they have faced and still face, rather than because "We know what's best for you and you don't" or "We're perfect and you're not" (this is how government propaganda presents such interventions here) will go a long way towards preventing this.
Although he has expressed a desire to end Nigeria's isolation, Abubakar should be given no quarter on this in any way whatsoever until he has released every single one of the political prisoners now being held as a result of Abacha's illegal assaults upon the constitutional rights of Nigerians. For example, if any attempt to repeat the US visit to Nigeria is met with the same Ikimi "shakara", it should be stressed that no such relaxation can be made while the political detainees remain behind bars.
In the light of his claim that Nigeria would abide by her international obligations, it should be made clear to General Abubakar that those obligations include not merely provision of peace-keeping and intervention forces, but that they also include treaty obligations to uphold and respect the human rights of her citizens, and that there can no end to international isolation while such contemptuous disregard of these obligations continues (as characterised by Ikimi's brazen assertion at Geneva in April that Nigeria has no political prisoners).
The features of the Abacha transition which make it anti democratic should be pointed out to Abubakar, and he should be encouraged to resile from his earlier unequivocal support for that programme. His obligation is not to Abacha, but to the Nigerian people. And unless he intends to continue Abacha's corrupt, undemocratic and unconstitutional methods, he cannot continue Abacha's programme.
The help and assistance which the international community stands ready to give Nigeria if and when it reverses the abuses of the last few years should be made clear to the Nigerian people, particularly as these relate to assistance for transport, electricity, water, communications and petroleum products. The benefits which Nigeria has been denied because of the Abacha government's policies should be explained - e.g. withdrawal of loans for the above and other development projects.
Of the two options which are available if the Abacha transition is scrapped, the pro-democracy community looks forward to the support of the international community for the Government of National Unity/Sovereign National Conference option.
In particular, because of the (necessary) vagueness about the specifics of a GNU and a SNC, suggestions and assistance as to the mechanics of such bodies, how they have functioned in other countries, legal framework etc. etc. would be useful.
Emphasis on the fact that all parts of Nigeria have much to gain from a genuinely SNC, and countering fears about which regions stand to lose, and whether they will lose at all, will do much to ensure that all parts of the country approach the SNC in a positive frame of mind, as equal partners, rather than in defensive or offensive mode, or as contributors as against takers.